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Staying on Course in Turbulent Times:  
National Political Elites and the  
Crisis of European Integration   
Lars Vogel & Juan Rodríguez-Teruel ∗ 
Abstract: »Auf Kurs in turbulenten Zeiten: Die nationalen politischen Eliten 
und die Krise der europäischen Integration«. European Integration is currently 
facing tremendous challenges caused by a series of cumulating crises. Their on-
set was the global financial and economic crisis in 2008 that rapidly evolved 
into a sovereign debt crisis, further into a crisis of the Eurozone and led even-
tually to a political crisis of the entire EU. National political elites have been 
among the core actors to cope with these challenges. Their behaviour is driven 
by their Europeanness, i.e. their emotionally and rationally determined atti-
tudes, cognitions and strategies regarding European Integration. Given their 
pivotal role, the purpose of this introductory article is twofold: Firstly, provid-
ing an overview about the elitist approach to European integration by intro-
ducing the main concepts, the methodology and the data basis on which the 
country studies in this HSR Special Issue rely on; secondly, enfolding a compar-
ative perspective on the development of national elites’ Europeanness during 
the course of the mentioned crises. The article shows that the crises have af-
fected national elites’ Europeanness in complex ways that are determined by 
the diverging impact they had on the investigated countries and by how elites 
perceive the efficiency of supranational integration to cope with them. Beyond 
national differences, the general evaluations of Europeanness remain quite sta-
ble pro-European while preferences regarding the concrete organization of in-
tegration are rather prone to change. Elites’ Europeanness primarily shifts in 
countries, in which strong Eurosceptic parties gained ground during the men-
tioned crisis indicating that there is a challenge of responsiveness for the still 
overwhelmingly pro-European elites. 
Keywords: European integration, Political elites, Crisis, Euroscepticism, Euro-
peanness, Comparative elite survey. 
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1.  The Scope of the Research: National Political Elites in 
the Context of European Crises 
1.1  Analyzing the Europeanness of National Political Elites 
In a moment in which the EU is facing tremendous challenges, in which – for 
the first time in its history – one of its Member States has declared to leave the 
EU, this HSR Special Issue addresses the core actors in these processes, i.e. 
national political elites, and analyses their attitudes and behaviour towards 
European integration asking how they were influenced by the sequence of 
cumulating crises ongoing since 2008. It does so by presenting case studies for 
10 EU Member States thereby relying on a unique longitudinal research design 
that encompasses – for most of the investigated countries – three surveys 
among national parliamentarians. Those surveys were conducted in the interna-
tional research projects IntUne (2007 and 2009) and ENEC (2014) with identi-
cal questionnaires, thereby spanning various stages of the mentioned crises.  
This elitist approach on the process of European integration considers na-
tional political elites as the pivotal driving forces who establish, maintain, 
transform – or even dissipate – the institutions and politics of the European 
Union. Elites are those ‘persons, who are able, by virtue of their strategic posi-
tions in powerful organizations and movements, to affect political outcomes 
regularly and substantially’ (Higley and Burton 2006). According to this view, 
the process of European integration is an ongoing process, in which national 
political elites do bargain – and usually find accord – about the distribution of 
competences in the European system of multilevel governance. In this process, 
national political elites actions are not entirely autonomous, but their relative 
importance is greater in comparison to non-elites due to their formal empow-
erment as members of the national legislative and executive institutions and the 
associated authority and resources. National political elites have a pivotal role 
in the multilevel system of the EU: they are simultaneously members of the 
core institutions, European Council and the Council of Ministers, and they are 
the Herren der Verträge (Masters of the treaties, as coined by the German 
Constitutional Court in its judgment on the Treaty of Maastricht), who consent 
and ratify the treaties shaping the integration process. Thus, they ultimately 
decide on the restriction of national sovereignty and the continuance of Euro-
pean integration. The parliamentarians (or MPs), who are in the focus of this 
special issue, are an important subgroup of the national political elites. Alt-
hough their individual influence may differ depending on the particular posi-
tion they occupy within their party or in the parliament, they decide collective-
ly about the state budget and thus the broad direction of policy, select or 
deselect the government – none of the investigated countries is a presidential 
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system1, and  many of them are precedently or simultaneously to their legisla-
tive mandates members of the executive, since parliaments are central recruit-
ment pools for governmental elite positions. Moreover, owing to their position 
as representatives of their respective populations, their stances towards Europe-
an integration and those of the population are mutually influencing each other. 
Moreover, the top-down influence of elite behavior on populations’ perceptions 
and opinions about the EU prevails in comparison to the opposite direction of 
opinion molding (Gabel and Scheve 2007; Sanders and Toka 2013). 
Finally, the actual scope of political elites’ impact varies substantially be-
tween countries and within time, as it is enlarged or constrained by the elites 
from other realms (e.g. from the economy), by their voters and the entire popu-
lation, and finally by the institutional, political, economic and cultural context 
elites are embedded in. Crises are critical junctures in which elites’ constraints 
are especially weak, since they are characterized by abrupt and tremendous 
events for which no institutional or otherwise proven solutions are at hand, 
entailing uncertainty about the consequences of action. In such situations actors 
pursue strategies to overcome this uncertainty. Those who are successful estab-
lish an institutional framework that makes behaviour more predictable in terms 
of costs and benefits, but simultaneously reduces the leeway of action by re-
stricting particular behaviour and promoting others. Although crises increase 
the uncertainty about the consequences of behaviour, the room of manoeuvre 
for elites is enlarged simultaneously (Best and Vogel 2014). 
If elites are the central actors in the process of European integration in gen-
eral and in particular in times of crises, the question for the premises and ra-
tionales underlying their behaviour emerges. All contributions in this special 
issue refer in one way or another to the concept of Europeanness, which is 
defined as multidimensional set of attitudes towards European integration 
encompassing multiple and sometimes even contradictory components that 
structure – but not determine – elites’ behavior (Best, Lengyel and Verzichelli 
2012a). It encompasses different modes (e.g. cognitions, emotions, evaluations) 
and objects (e.g. institutions, actors, policies) of attitudes toward European 
integration. National elites vary, moreover, with respect to the different dimen-
sions of Europeanness entailing a variety of party- and country-specific pat-
terns of Europeanness (Cotta and Russo 2012). Although not applied in a uni-
form way, all articles in this Special Issue report on those dimensions which the 
country experts judge as most relevant for the respective country but consider 
as well the core dimensions that have been already identified as relevant in 
comparative studies. Among them is the emotive dimension including attitudes 
like the emotional attachment to Europe expressed by the self-identification as 
                                                             
1  Lithuana is a semipresidential system in which the president is elected, but the government 
is responsible to both the parliament and the president. 
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European, while the cognitive dimension evaluates the state of European inte-
gration oscillating between the two poles of deepening and rolling back (Best, 
Lengyel and Verzichelli 2012b). The conative-projective dimension (Best, 
Lengyel and Verzichelli 2012b) or scope of governance (Cotta and Isernia 
2009; Cotta and Russo 2012) comprises the approval or rejection of particular 
policy delegation to the EU, which is independent from the rather general emo-
tive and cognitive evaluation of European integration. The dimension of repre-
sentation (Ibd.) encompasses different means and concepts of integration, 
whereby intergovernmentalism and federalism constituting the two opposing 
poles. Other facets of Europeanness that are considered throughout the articles 
and that are in manifold ways linked to or differentiated from the mentioned 
dimensions are trust in European core institutions, threats to the EU and Euro-
pean integration, and the perception and evaluation of the performance of EU 
institutions during the course of the crises. 
1.2  Elites‘ Europeanness before the Crisis: The IntUne Survey 2007 
To analyze the state and the development of the Europeanness of national polit-
ical elites the special issue takes advantage of the unique research design that is 
provided by the integration of three standardized surveys among national par-
liamentarians conducted in 2007, 2009 and 2014. The IntUne project2 was a 
comprehensive study on European citizenship between 2005 and 2009 that 
surveyed national political elites3 and their populations in eighteen European 
countries regarding their political attitudes towards European Integration. Re-
sults of the first wave of surveys in 2007 provided empirical evidence that 
elites’ support on all dimensions of Europeanness was significantly more pro-
nounced than among the general population, and anti-European attitudes were 
exceptional (Best, Lengyel and Verzichelli 2012a; Jerez, Real-Dato and 
Vázquez 2015). However, the picture of a ‘permissive consensus’ (Hooghe and 
Marks 2008) among European national elites consensually supporting Europe-
an integration needed some qualifications. The results indicated a ‘Europe á la 
carte’ (Cotta and Russo 2012), in which elites possess partly contradictory 
attitudes towards Europe and its integration condensing to country specific 
combinations of Europeanness. In particular, the favoured allocation of policies 
to the national or the supranational level has been proven as the result of elites’ 
strategic considerations about which losses and gains this allocation would 
entail for them among their national electorates. In contrast, the integration in 
                                                             
2  The theoretical fundaments and the methodological design of the research for the IntUne 
Project at the elite level, see Best, Lengyel and Verzichelli (2012). For the IntUne Project at 
the citizens level, see Sanders, Toka, Bellucci and Torcal (2012). 
3  Economic, media and trade-union elites were also interviewed. 
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the transnational elite network and the interaction in the European institutions 
did only weakly intensify the commitment to Europe. However, the perceived 
benefits the own country has gained from EU-membership was proven as the 
pivotal driving force for pro-European attitudes. The national political, economic 
and cultural context appeared as primarily shaping the accordingly heterogeneous 
elite attitudes towards Europe. Although this heterogeneity provides flexibility in 
the EU bargaining and decision making processes, it was doubtful whether such 
commitment prevails in face of a massive threat to the national and the common 
interests of the Member States and their elites (Best 2012). 
1.3  The Global Financial and Economic Crisis since 2008: The 
IntUne survey 2009 
Such a massive threat was just before dawn when national elites in Europe 
were surveyed in 2007. Following the economic boom, which was sustained by 
an increasingly overheating financial system, the onset of the global financial 
and economic crisis was marked by the spectacular bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers in 2008. The burst of the real estate bubbles worldwide and primarily 
in the US undermined the credibility of banking houses severely leading to 
serious credit crunches and resulting in economic contraction and rising levels 
of unemployment worldwide comparable only to the economic recession wit-
nessed during the Great Depression in the 1930s (see Figure 1).  
Figure 1: Development of GDP Growth Rate 2007-2014 
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National governments responded with deficit spending and expanding public 
debt in order to bail out the banking houses allegedly ‘too big to fail’ and sub-
stituting for investments otherwise not provided by market-based credit flow. 
The national political elites of the Member States of the EU coordinated their 
efforts and supplemented them by attempts to tighten the regulations of the 
banking and financial system. These measures followed the assumption shared 
by political elites in Europe and beyond that the neoliberal release of regula-
tions in the past and the lack of efficient political control of the globalized 
financial markets were among the main causes of the disastrous financial and 
economic situation in 2009 (Reinhart and Rogoff 2011), which was the year the 
second IntUne survey was conducted. 
Figure 2: Development of Government Cross Debt (Percentage of GDP) 
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levels of sovereign debt and evolved the crisis further into a sovereign debt 
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rates for state bonds of Ireland, Greece and Portugal increased tremendously, 
since financial market actors lost confidence that these countries would contin-
ue to perform its debt service and major rating agencies downgraded their 
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participation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the IMF (Hodson 
2011). Subsequently, the temporary European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 
and the permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM) were established to 
institutionalize a permanent rescue mechanism for those Member States encoun-
tering difficulties in selling their state bonds at the private financial market and 
thus at risk of default. At this stage, the sovereign debt crisis had eventually 
evolved into a crisis of the entire Eurozone, given that the exit of some Member 
States and its subsequent disintegration appeared as likely scenarios. 
All rescue measures and mechanisms were based on loans provided by the 
financially prosperous Member States, the EU and the IWF. The availment of 
these loans is conditional and requires that debtor states enact austerity policies 
to reach and/or maintain fiscal stability (bailout-against-austerity policy). These 
conditions have been fixed in the diverse Memoranda of Understanding but 
ultimately in the European Fiscal Compact (EFC) and comprise amongst others 
a balanced state budget, a debt ceiling installed in the constitution of each 
country (or comparable level), and automatic sanctions should members fail to 
meet the conditions of the EFC. The EFC is a multilateral treaty ratified by 
most EU Member States except the Czech Republic and Great Britain, thereby 
circumventing the decisional mechanisms and institutions of the EU. The con-
ditions for loans formulated in the Memoranda of Understanding and the EFC, 
esp. austerity as policy goal, enfolded their impact not only in those countries 
that formally requested financial aid. For instance, Spain and Italy were risking 
contagion in terms of increasing interest rates and although they were not actu-
ally facing default, their governments felt urged to pursue preventive policies. 
Accordingly, they reduced their public spending and initiated reforms intending 
to prevent the further increase of interest rates and avert to rely on the support 
by international and EU rescue mechanisms. 
The austerity policy of the EU entailed shrinking public expenditure in times 
in which the economic recession was still ongoing in most of the debtor states, 
esp. in Southern Europe. This combination caused persistent economic difficul-
ties, which fuelled social unrest, increased political disaffection of the popula-
tion with their governments and with the EU (Roth 2009; Sanders, Tóka and 
Magalhães 2012; Wozniak Boyle and Hasselman 2015) and made populist, 
extremist or anti-system political alternatives gain ground. They even became 
part of the national governments (like Syriza in Greece) or at least had signifi-
cant impact on their policies (Ukip, Podemos, Fives Star Movement). Simulta-
neously, non-elites expressed doubts about the efficacy of the current institu-
tional architecture of the EU to cope with the crisis and linked the deteriorating 
economic situation of themselves or of their country to the austerity measures 
imposed by the EU, which undermined the output legitimacy of the latter 
(Bellamy 2010). In sum, the Eurozone crisis has evolved even further into a 
political crisis of the entire EU. 
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1.4  From Crisis to Crisis: The ENEC Survey 2014 
Since the IntUne project was finished in 2009, it did not capture the roughly 
sketched events drifting the development of the global financial and economic 
crisis to a sovereign debt crisis, to a crisis of the Eurozone and ultimately to a 
crisis of European integration. To fill this gap, the ENEC project (European 
National Elites and the Crisis)4 was initiated as follow up study by scholars in 
eleven European Countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, France, Greece, Germany, Hun-
gary, Italy, Lithuania, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain) and surveyed elites’ attitudes 
again in 2014 and thus six years after the onset of the crisis. The ENEC survey 
and its integration with the IntUne data provide the unique opportunity of a 
longitudinal examination of elite’s Europeanness. Given that the first survey 
was conducted before the outbreak of the crisis in 2007, in most of the coun-
tries a quasi-experimental design can be applied to compare elites’ attitudes 
before and during the crisis, examining the impact of one of the most contem-
porary critical junctures of the European integration process. 
The countries in the sample represent different stages of integration and are 
differently affected by the crises. Germany and Italy are two of the founding 
countries of the EU while the remaining countries are eight newcomers of 
different waves. Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovenia and Croatia are four 
former communist countries with different economic and democratic perfor-
mance. With the exception of Croatia and Bulgaria all other countries are 
members of the Eurozone. Most important for our research in the impact of the 
crisis of European integration is, however, that the sample contains countries 
that were bailed out by the sketched rescue mechanisms (Greece and Portugal) 
or adopted the accompanying austerity policies due to rational anticipation and 
political pressure (Spain and Italy). On the other side, the sample includes 
Germany as the main advocate of austerity policy and the most important credi-
tor state (see chapter on Germany in this special issue). With this coverage the 
selection of Member States is indeed not representing the totality of national 
elites in the EU, but it covers main regions of the EU and the salient conflict 
lines that were structuring the most recent crises.  
In analyzing the impact of the sketched crises on elites’ Europeanness, we 
consider elites as strategic actors, who perceive supranational integration as 
strategy to reduce the uncertainty of risky developments and environments – 
such as globalization – and to empower themselves, when they perceive the 
resources and capabilities of their nation state too limited to pursue their inter-
est (Moravcsik 1999; Haller 2008). For instance, the initial establishment of the 
European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 and the European Economic 
Community in the Treaties of Rome in 1957 was a response of Europe’s na-
                                                             
4  <http://enec-2014.wix.com/enec-2014>. 
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tional elites to overcome the post-war economic devastation and political de-
scent of Europe after 1945, and to counter the threat of Soviet-style com-
munism. Their underlying rationale was that Europe – and its national elites – 
could not survive in face of these global challenges, if they had relied exclu-
sively on their national resources and continued the blatantly destructive rivalry 
for hegemony in Europe that culminated in WWII. This insight established a 
common interest of the national elites in the founding countries of the EU and 
fostered a ‘consensually unified elite’ (Higley and Burton 2006) whose mem-
bers share a ‘permissive consensus’ (Hooghe and Marks 2008) on the necessity 
of European integration and its institutionalization. 
This perspective suggests that national elites’ Europeanness remains un-
changed – or even increases – in case they perceive the EU as more efficient 
means to cope with arising crises compared to alternative national solutions. 
This assumption helps to understand why national elites throughout Europe 
accepted the ‘bailout-against-austerity’ policy although it stratified the EU, 
enlarged asymmetries based on the power of the national economies, and en-
tailed domestic social and political upheaval. They accepted this policy, be-
cause they perceived this as the only solution to prevent the explosion of their 
national state indebtedness and the further breakdown of their economies, 
which otherwise would be at the mercy of the globalized financial market. If 
we turn around this argument, elites’ level of Europeanness may decrease in 
the course of the crises, in case they see their room of maneuver shrinking in 
the conduct of European integration and if they can rely on alternative national 
solutions to cope with the challenges of the crises. 
Elites act, however, not completely autonomous. The mentioned concept of 
permissive consensus stresses elite autonomy, because the established political 
elites in the Member States did not offer Eurosceptic stances to their voters for 
a long period and, accordingly, European integration did not constitute a politi-
cized and salient issue in the competition between the established parties. This 
period of elite autonomy regarding the issue of European integration, basing on 
elite consensus and a quiescent public, in which articulation of Euroscepticism 
was restricted to the fringes of the party system, came to an end with the Maas-
tricht Treaty and has been incrementally replaced by a ‘constraining dissensus’ 
(Hooghe and Marks 2008). This latter concept underlines that the room of 
manoeuvre for national political elites in Europe becomes increasingly con-
strained by the politicization of European integration among the population, 
because the population is on average less supportive for European integration 
(Müller, Jenny and Ecker 2012). This politicization can be fuelled by emerging 
Eurosceptic parties or by the established mainstream parties, if the latter expect 
electoral benefits from proposing Eurosceptic stances. In this respect, all the 
contributions in this special issue regard the two underlying mechanisms that 
may lead to an alteration of Europeanness during the course of the crisis. On 
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the one hand, Eurosceptic parties enter parliament for the first time or enlarge 
their number of seats, which may results in shrinking Europeanness due to 
electoral turn-over. On the other hand, elites of the established mainstream 
parties may change their Europeanness either due to their individual reasoning 
or due to opportunistic adjustments caused by the (anticipated) perception of 
attitudinal shifts among the population. 
The politicization is further boosted, since elites and population differ in 
their reasoning about European integration. While elites are strategic actors (s. 
above), who additionally possess reliable information about the EU and whose 
actions matter for the stability and performance of European integration, the 
population is more distant, less informed and bases their judgment on proxies 
such as the performance of the domestic government (Gabel 1998; Gabel and 
Scheve 2007) or rather general evaluations such as issues of national identifica-
tion (Carey 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2005; Hobolt and Wratil 2015). Despite 
these general evaluations, the combination of economic recession and ‘bailout-
against-austerity’ policy imposed by the dominant actors of the EU during the 
crises was a highly salient political issue among the populations. They may in-
creasingly perceive the EU as cause of the economic deterioration of their coun-
try or their individual hardships and withdraw their support for European integra-
tion, especially in those countries that had to request for the support of the rescue 
mechanisms and were urged to impose austerity measures (Roth 2009; Sanders, 
Tóka and Magalhães 2012; Wozniak Boyle and Hasselman 2015). 
In general, we expect that the development of national elites’ Europeanness 
during the course of the crisis reflects the trade-off between the empowerment 
and political support national elites gain from European integration and the risk 
that they will be pushed to enforce unpopular policies imposed by the EU, for 
which they are then likely to be punished by their national voters. 
2.  Methodology of the Research 
Beside the analysis of longitudinal developments offered by the integration of 
the IntUne and ENEC data, the other major contribution of the articles in this 
HSR Special Issue is the analysis of the new data carried out from the ENEC 
project in 2014. The content of the ENEC questionnaire consists of several 
questions taken from the previous IntUne surveys conducted in 2007 and 2009, 
and new questions specifically addressing the management of the Eurozone 
crisis by the EU institutions. 
In the 2014 ENEC wave, the sample design started with determining the 
sample size, an amount of interviews large enough so that the overall results 
were valid, but not so high as to jeopardize the viability of the survey. As other 
authors have pointed out before, conducting surveys of elites often presents 
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additional difficulties compared to public opinion surveys, such as the difficul-
ty of access (either for institutional or agenda reasons of the interviewee) or 
reluctance to respond to questions that are outside the scope of the interview-
ee’s expertise or that may be politically or personally uncomfortable 
(Rodríguez-Teruel and Daloz 2016). Given these difficulties, the countries with 
the largest number of parliaments (more than 300 seats in the main chamber) 
had a total number of 80 interviews, while in those with less MPs, the number 
of interviews was reduced to 50. Then, as seen in Table 1, each team made the 
maximum number of interviews that were possible, in some cases exceeding 
the assigned quota (for example, in Portugal, where 80 interviews were 
achieved), while in others teams were below target. 
Table 1: Main Features of the Survey ENEC-2014 for each Country 
Population Designed sample Final sample Start fieldwork End fieldwork
% interviews 
face-to-face 
Bulgaria 240 50 53 05.11.2014 19.12.2014 100,0 
Croatia 151 50 70 20.06.2014 31.12.2014 91,4 
Germany 631 80 70 08.10.2014 17.12.2014 0,0 
Greece 300 80 74 14.02.2014 03.03.2015 93,2 
Hungary 198 50 57 16.09.2014 31.12.2014 100,0 
Italy 630 80 82 20.01.2014 26.06.2014 5,6 
Lithuania 141 50 54 01.05.2014 30.06.2014 100,0 
Portugal 230 50 81 20.02.2014 23.06.2014 98,8 
Slovenia 90 50 50 24.03.2014 09.03.2015 58,0 
Spain 350 80 81 21.10.2014 18.02.2015 76,5 
Total - - 718 20.01.2014 15.06.2015 73,3 
Source: Real-Dato 2015. 
 
The sample for each country was designed to be as representative as possible of 
the parliamentary chamber to which the interviewees belonged. The sample 
employs three stratification criteria: the size of the parliamentary group, the sex 
and the degree of experience in the chamber, differentiating in this case be-
tween parliamentarians with more than one legislature in the chamber of those 
who were in their first term. The aim was to prevent the final sample from 
overstepping low-experienced parliamentarians, who generally do not hold 
positions of responsibility in the chamber or parliamentary group and tend to 
have a looser agenda that makes them more accessible. However, the claim of 
complete representativeness in this kind of surveys is limited. On the one hand, 
the success of data gathering in the fieldwork usually depends on the active 
consent of the interviewee (or his cabinet). This necessarily means that the 
survey result contains an inevitable bias of self-selection – that is, respondents 
are often those who are most interested in responding. 
A relevant issue deals with the resulting gap between the initial sample and 
the one finally achieved. Along with the small misalignments previously noted 
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in the total of interviews in some countries, there are also some differences in 
the strata of the sample (party, sex and degree of experience). In general, these 
mismatches are lower in the case of party stratification and by sex, but greater 
in terms of political experience. In order to prevent these mismatches affecting 
the representativeness of the data, we have prepared the corresponding post-
stratification weights, which are applied in the analysis presented in the follow-
ing pages. 
3. Elites' Europeanness in Times of Crisis: A Comparative 
Analysis 
In this section, we introduce a cross-country longitudinal analysis covering the 
evolution of the main features of national elites’ Europeanness between 2007 
and 2014. This analysis is complemented by an overview of the country specif-
ic findings provided in the articles of this Special Issue.The aim is to identify 
across countries general patterns of the main consequences of the financial 
crisis on the elites’ attitudes towards the EU, and the resulting main challenges 
for the future of the European project. 
3.1  Evolution of Elite’s Attitudes Towards Europe (2007-2014) 
In this comparative introduction, we focus on the country similarities and dis-
similarities regarding the main aspects of the elites' Europeanness. The aim is 
to observe to what extent there has been a general European pattern of stability 
(or change). We also check whether country or regional particularities affect 
the views of national political elites regarding the future of the European pro-
ject. In this respect, some specific country evolutions (as the arrival to power of 
right-wing nationalism in Hungary, or the severe consequences of the bailout in 
Greece) have produced particular patterns of change. To begin with the identity 
dimension of Europeanness, we can observe the remarkable stability of the 
attachment to Europe expressed by the parliamentary elites (see Figure 3) over 
time, with the relevant exception of Greece.  
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Figure 3: Attachment to Europe 
 
Source: INTUNE and ENEC projects. 
 
The significant decrease of the attachment reveals the distance produced by the 
Eurozone crisis since 2009 among the Greek elites, although they were already 
among those countries with weaker attachment to Europe in 2007 and 2009. 
Similarly, we observe stability in the trust to the core European institutions, 
although the feeling deteriorates in some countries (Figure 4).  
Figure 4: Trust in European Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy in the EU 
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Indeed, the trust in the more intergovernmental institution (the Council of the 
EU) has evolved towards more heterogeneity among countries in 2014 than we 
could see in 2007 and 2009. This increasing gap between Member States is the 
result of two different patterns. While Bulgaria and Lithuania reinforce their 
trust in these institutions, the other countries tend to reduce it, particularly those 
Southern countries more affected by the austerity measures imposed by the EU, 
like Portugal or Greece. The same occurs with the trust in the European Com-
mission (EC). On the contrary, trust in the European Parliament (EP) remains 
unaltered for most of the countries, except Hungary. Besides, in all these indi-
cators, the important increase of the trust in the European institutions among 
Bulgarian parliamentarians is a specific effect of the learning process after the 
entry in the EU (2007). Furthermore, the perception about how democracy 
works at the level of the EU shows a common negative trend, as it has slightly 
decreased for all countries between 2009 and 2014. This is not surprising, since 
the levels of institutional trust seem to be positively connected to the satisfac-
tion with EU democracy (Ruivo and Tavares 2015, 113). Here, Germany ap-
pears as a significant exception. Overall, this portrait reflects how the financial 
and subsequent crises may have fed feelings of disappointment among the 
national representatives, who anyway still displays a stronger European identity 
compared to their represented (Sojka et al. 2015, 79). 
Figure 5: Elite’s Perceptions of EU: National Interest and Membership Benefit 
 
Source: INTUNE and ENEC projects. 
 
Following the utilitarian explanation of Europeanness, these signs of decline in 
attachment to Europe and trust among the elites could be related to the percep-
tion of how the national interests are represented in the EU. Accordingly, in 
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2014 we can observe an increase of the conviction that the decisions made at 
the EU level do not take the national interest sufficiently into account (Figure 
5). With the sole exception of Lithuania and, remarkably, Germany, all the 
countries increase their criticism in this aspect, particularly the Southern coun-
tries such as Portugal, Spain and, above all, Greece (where MPs answering this 
issue critically rose from 24.4 to 82.2). This evolution is reflected to some 
extent in the view of how each country has benefited from the EU membership 
likewise. While there was a strong consensus about this benefit in 2007 (when 
all countries’ elites but Hungary shared a positive view in this aspect, above 
95%), the Eurozone crisis has coincided with a decline in some countries, par-
ticularly in Greece and Italy. Still, the majority of the MPs acknowledge that 
the EU has provided important benefits for their Member States. This idea 
remains a core attitude defended by almost all the national parliamentarians in 
Germany and Spain. 
The identity or emotive dimension of the elite’s Europeanness is substan-
tively related to the cognitive-evaluative dimension (s. 1.1), although not in a 
mechanical way, as lower levels of attachment or trust could not necessarily 
dissuade representatives from supporting the strengthening of the EU (Cotta 
and Russo 2012, 21). Therefore, stability is also the main trend regarding the 
attitudes about the preferred institutional design claimed by the parliamentari-
ans (Figure 6).  
Figure 6: Elite’s Attitudes Towards the EU Institutional Design  
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Source: INTUNE and ENEC projects. 
Note: Support to strengthen measured between 0 (non) and 10 (totally). 
 
The great support for strengthening the EP remains unaltered, with the only 
exception of the Hungarian MPs (for whom this attitude has clearly deteriorat-
ed) and Lithuania’s parliamentary elite (who have steadily increased their sup-
port between 2007 and 2014). There is also important continuity in the percep-
tion that states should remain the central actors of the EU. In this case, there is 
a country divide between those with strong support to this intergovernmental 
view of the EU (Bulgaria, Lithuania, Hungary) and those other where this view 
is slightly decreasing (Italy, Germany or Spain). Instead, some of these coun-
tries prefer to foster the European Commission as a true government for Eu-
rope, while in Hungary this idea has sharply declined. Overall, there are no 
relevant changes in the patterns of support to strengthen the EU, despite the 
collapse among the Hungarian MPs. However, the support for a state-like de-
mocracy for the EU reveals a deep divide between the elites from countries 
with a more federalist view (like Spain, Italy and Slovenia, with rates of sup-
port around 90%) and those others like from Hungary (with only 20%), who 
has a majority not supporting this federal approach for the EU. 
One important indicator about the role of the EU in the policymaking pro-
cess are the elites’ preferences regarding which institutional layer should be 
responsible for dealing with certain policy issues. According to this, respond-
ents were asked where a specific policy should be allocated: at the EU level, at 
the national or regional level, or both sharing the competence. We may distin-
guish several patterns of evolution in this aspect (Table 2). Hence, there has 
been an important advance of the support for the EU level as the main policy 
level for issues like unemployment, immigration or environment. This change 
shows the perception that policies beyond the control of the national states need 
to be managed at the European level in order to grant an effective outcome. In 
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all these areas, the preference for policy allocation exclusively to the national 
or regional policy levels has decreased substantially across time. On the contra-
ry, the health policy and the fight against crime are still perceived as an issue 
that should be managed by national (or subnational) institutions. Therefore, 
most countries still defend the national or regional levels for the health policy 
(higher than 60% in all of them, except Greece), although the EU level has also 
gained support in many of these countries. In term of country patterns, we may 
distinguish those where most of the policies should be allocated only at the EU 
level from those that are still supporting for a national control of these issues 
(Hungary), or the case of Italy, with a prevailing support for cooperation across 
levels for most of the policies. 
Table 2: Preferred main Policy-Making Level for the Mentioned Issues  
 Unemployment Immigration Environment Crime Health
 07 09 14 07 09 14 07 09 14 07 09 14 07 09 14 
Bulgaria      
Only the EU 0,0 1,3 5,7 8,6 17,1 11,3 16,0 19,7 24,5 6,1 14,5 5,7 1,2 2,6 3,8 
EU + nat./reg. 33,3 9,2 43,4 59,3 43,4 56,6 53,1 43,4 49,1 52,4 42,1 47,2 40,7 18,4 18,9 
Only nat./reg. 65,4 80,3 50,9 28,4 26,3 32,1 30,9 22,4 26,4 41,5 28,9 47,2 58,0 63,2 77,4 
Germany      
Only the EU 9,3 7,6 34,3 73,3 51,9 72,9 61,3 38,0 67,1 36,0 16,5 47,1 8,0 6,3 12,9 
EU + nat./reg. 10,7 1,3 15,7 12,0 10,1 14,3 9,3 11,4 11,4 17,3 13,9 14,3 4,0 2,5 7,1 
Only nat./reg. 80,0 91,1 50,0 14,7 38,0 12,9 29,3 50,6 21,4 46,7 69,6 38,6 88,0 91,1 80,0 
Greece      
Only the EU 5,6 14,6 47,3 17,8 26,8 54,1 23,3 29,3 70,3 7,8 7,3 20,3 3,3 4,9 24,3 
EU + nat./reg. 58,9 51,2 33,8 67,8 70,7 32,4 61,1 65,9 20,3 60,0 53,7 29,7 45,6 61,0 25,7 
Only nat./reg. 34,4 34,1 18,9 14,4 2,4 13,5 15,6 2,4 9,5 32,2 36,6 50,0 51,1 34,1 50,0 
Hungary      
Only the EU 15,0 16,7 17,5 52,5 66,7 47,4 46,2 69,4 45,6 30,0 38,9 31,6 7,6 9,7 14,0 
EU + nat./reg. 12,5 8,3 31,6 28,7 11,1 35,1 8,8 8,3 24,6 36,2 19,4 42,1 13,9 4,2 17,5 
Only nat./reg. 71,2 70,8 50,9 18,8 22,2 15,8 45,0 20,8 29,8 33,8 41,7 26,3 78,5 86,1 68,4 
Italy      
Only the EU 31,0 22,9 37,0 56,0 61,4 40,7 64,3 67,1 77,8 29,8 30,0 23,5 4,8 5,7 12,3 
EU + nat./reg. 20,2 25,7 38,3 26,2 25,7 45,7 22,6 22,9 19,8 28,6 34,3 44,4 20,2 11,4 21,0 
Only nat./reg. 48,8 50,0 23,5 17,9 12,9 12,3 13,1 10,0 2,5 41,7 35,7 30,9 75,0 82,9 66,7 
Lithuania      
Only the EU 17,5 12,9 38,9 43,8 61,4 61,1 47,5 61,4 61,1 23,8 34,3 51,9 6,2 18,6 3,7 
EU + nat./reg. 0,0 4,3 0,0 6,2 7,1 0,0 3,8 5,7 0,0 5,0 4,3 0,0 1,2 5,7 0,0 
Only nat./reg. 80,0 81,4 61,1 47,5 30,0 38,9 46,2 31,4 38,9 68,8 61,4 48,1 90,0 75,7 96,3 
Portugal      
Only the EU 37,5 35,3 46,2 71,2 75,0 60,5 67,5 63,2 64,2 38,8 60,3 35,8 10,0 42,6 14,8 
EU + nat./reg. 20,0 23,5 33,8 22,5 20,6 27,2 20,0 17,6 18,5 30,0 26,5 29,6 13,8 35,3 23,5 
Only nat./reg. 42,5 41,2 20,0 6,2 4,4 12,3 12,5 19,1 17,3 31,2 13,2 34,6 76,2 22,1 61,7 
Spain      
Only the EU 10,6 23,5 34,6 38,3 58,0 70,4 41,5 67,9 70,4 27,7 50,6 51,9 2,1 17,3 14,8 
EU + nat./reg. 25,5 14,8 33,3 36,2 18,5 23,5 28,7 18,5 18,5 36,2 23,5 24,7 21,3 8,6 21,0 
Only nat./reg. 62,8 61,7 32,1 24,5 23,5 4,9 28,7 13,6 11,1 34,0 25,9 21,0 75,5 74,1 67,2 
Source: INTUNE and ENEC projects. 
Note: Percentages are per column (same country, policy field and year). Other answers are not 
included. 
 
The general overview suggests strong continuity in the core dimensions of 
elites’ Europeanness. Still, some relevant patterns of change could be identified 
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in the comparative analysis. First, there are some signs of disappointment or 
criticism towards the functioning of the European institutions. Conversely, 
these negative attitudes do not have eroded the support to strengthen the EU 
level as a central arena for policymaking, particularly in some policy areas. 
Finally, this evolution is largely influenced by country factors, which has pro-
duced some increase in the heterogeneity among countries. In this case, Greece 
and Hungary – for different reasons – appear as the most prominent exceptions 
to the general trend of stability reflected in the elites’ attitudes. 
3.2 Evaluating Crisis Performance and the Future of the EU – the 
View of Elites in 2014 
This longitudinal and comparative portrait of the emotive and cognitive dimen-
sions suggests that the financial crisis might have produced less negative ef-
fects among political elites than other scholars have found for the general elec-
torate (Sanders et al. 2012; Freire and Moury 2015; Teixeira et al. 2016; 
Wozniak Boyle and Hasselman 2015). However, we may also observe how this 
may have also shaped the attitudes and perceptions of the conative-projective 
dimension of elites’ Europeanness. In this respect, the 2014 ENEC survey 
included some questions about MPs’ perceptions about how the EU managed 
the financial crisis, and about their expectations and threats towards the future 
of the EU.  
Figure 7: Assessment of the Role Played by the EU Institutions During the 
Financial Crisis (2014) 
 
Source: ENEC project 
Note: Assessment measured between 0 (very bad) and 10 (very good). 
 
The perceptions regarding the management of the crisis reflect a critical per-
ception shared by most MPs. For instance, there is a common moderate as-
sessment of the role played by the EU institutions during the financial crisis 
(see Figure 7). Using a scale from 0 to 10, the national political elites give a 
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bad score – below 5 – in this issue. Significantly, the representative institutions 
(the EC and the EP) are slightly worst considered than the European Central 
Bank (ECB). Germany and Bulgaria, and to a lesser extent Slovenia and Spain, 
are the few countries with moderate better assessment. There is an ideological 
divide in this assessment, since in most countries the Social Democrats and, 
particularly, the new left use to score these institutions lower than the liberal 
and the conservative parties, except in Hungary and Italy.  
This moderately poor assessment does not necessarily make political elites 
more reluctant to support a greater role of the EU institutions in managing the 
financial crisis (Figure 8). There are two patterns of opinions regarding the 
main alternatives preferred. On the one hand, there are those countries which 
would prefer firstly the EU to lead the actions to manage the crisis (Italy, Por-
tugal, Spain), or to the same extent than a coordinated action by national gov-
ernments (Germany, Greece). On the other hand, the East European countries 
are more clearly in favour of actions leaded by national governments, either 
coordinated or even autonomously, to the detriment of the role of the EU insti-
tutions.  
Figure 8: Main Alternatives Preferred to Manage the Financial Crisis (2014) 
 
Source: ENEC project. 
Note: Columns show the proportion of MPs selecting each option as first or second choice. 
 
These perceptions about how the EU managed the crisis are helpful to under-
stand the elite’s conative attitudes towards the future. Indeed, the national 
divide is even stronger when analysing which should be the policy level for 
dealing with financial policies (Figure 9). Again, one set of countries clearly 
prefers that only the EU should be responsible for decisions in this field (par-
ticularly strong in Spain and Germany). On the contrary, those countries (ex-
ception Lithuania) preferring a national solution of the financial crisis also 
0
20
40
60
80
100
Croatia Slovenia Hungary Bulgaria Germany Greece Itay Portugal Spain
International financial institutions
EU
Coordinated action by national governments
HSR 41 (2016) 4  │  26 
support that this issue should be left in the hands of the national governments, 
or should be shared with the EU. 
Figure 9: Preferred Policy Level for Finance Policies (2014) 
 
Source: ENEC project. 
 
From a broader perspective, the national political elites show different expecta-
tions regarding the medium term evolution and the performance of the EU 
(Figure 10). Despite a national divide appears again, the set of countries differs 
from the previous aspects analysed above. On the one hand, there are some 
countries reflecting an optimistic prospect about political and social achieve-
ments by the EU in the next decade (Germany, Lithuania, Italy, Spain, and 
Bulgaria). Hence, the national political elites in these countries expect a deeper 
integration in the EU, and a positive evolution of the European economy to-
wards a more robust situation. For these respondents, political integration and 
economic performance shape together the main political horizon for Europe. 
This optimistic view is also reflected in other prospects, like the strengthening 
of the geopolitical power of the EU, and the positive social contribution to 
reduce the economic differences among state members as well as among citi-
zens within the same state. However, these economic prospects vary substan-
tially among countries. While for Bulgaria or Lithuania this is the main pro-
spect for the next ten years (which suggest the main priorities for their 
representatives), in Germany and Italy this is the opposite situation, as they 
express the lowest expectations among the surveyed countries regarding these 
policy outcomes. On the other hand, the other set of countries tend to express 
lower expectations in every policy, and particularly in the reduction of econom-
ic differences among states and citizens. These perceptions reflect largely their 
current weak economic situation (as it is the case of Greece, Portugal or Slove-
nia), or the increasing Euroscepticism of its national political elite (Hungary). 
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Figure 10: EU Long-Term Perspectives: in 10 years… (2014) 
 
Source: ENEC project. 
 
While the perspective of reducing the economic differences between Member 
States fluctuates notably among countries, all of them consider this factor as 
the main threat to the future of the EU (Figure 11). Similarly, to put states’ 
national interest first when making decisions at the EU also appears as a chal-
lenge to the EU, while the competition from emerging countries was amongst 
the three main threats for most countries (except Bulgaria and particularly 
Germany). These are the main similarities when identifying challenges and 
threats for the European integration. However, countries are divided regarding 
other political threats. At the end of 2014 immigration was mainly unconsid-
ered as a real threat for Europe, except for Eastern countries. Indeed, Bulgarian 
and Hungarian national elites considered it as the first challenge for Europe. To 
a lesser extent, Greece and Croatia (but not Slovenia) shared this perception. 
Interestingly, Germany or Italy did not have a great concern about immigration 
despite of having an increasing population of immigrants. In the same vein, 
those countries close to the Turkish border were more concerned about the risk 
of the enlargement to Turkey. 
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Figure 11: Threats to the EU 
 
Figure 12: Policy Preferences in 10 Years 
 
According to the importance given to the economical threats, it is unsurprising 
that there is a strong consensus across countries (and within them) about 
achieving a European framework to help EU regions with economic and social 
difficulties in the next years (Figure 12). To a lesser extent, the aim of develop-
ing a single EU foreign policy is another policy preference for the next years. 
On the contrary, other economic issues such as achieving a unified tax system 
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or the issuance of Eurobonds – related to traditional core policies of state 
members – are more divisive across countries. Those countries that required a 
bailout after the financial crisis shows indeed stronger support for the issue of 
Eurobonds.  
3.1  Country Specific Paths of Evolution 
The previous comparative analysis has demonstrated general developments but 
revealed country specific patterns as well. It is therefore important to take a 
closer look at the national peculiarities and explanatory factors, which are 
provided by the country experts in their articles. 
The analysis by Bojana Kocijan and Marko Kukec captures the moment one 
year after Croatia accessed the EU in 2013. While the Croatian national par-
liament unanimously voted in favour of this accession, slight tendencies of 
‘soft Euroscepticism’ can be observed just one year later. The Europeanness of 
Croatia’s national elites is primarily driven by economic cost-benefit calcula-
tions (‘the beneficiary member mindset’) while issues of cultural identity are of 
secondary importance. Croatian elites are strongly pro-European in nearly all 
dimensions of Europeanness, since they are almost consensually unified re-
garding the economic benefits from European integration given the status of 
Croatia as net receiver in the EU. Nevertheless, conservative parties tend to be 
slightly reluctant when it comes to cultural issues, for instance regarding immi-
gration.  
Germany is one of the countries in which the effect of the global financial 
and economic crisis was heavy but short-lasting, while its economy recovered 
quickly afterwards. This situation, combined with a comparable flat increase of 
state budget debt, made it to the main contributor to the EU rescue mechanisms 
and bailout packages and allowed to transform its own austerity policy to the 
EU-wide dominant political approach to cope with the crises. Lars Vogel 
demonstrates that the Europeanness of Germany’s political elite is structured 
by the five dimensions of general support, trust in EU institutions, ideological 
aims and cultural boundaries of European integration, and the means of integra-
tion (intergovernmental or federal conceptions, and policy delegation to the 
European level). While most of them proved to be stable, the different stages of 
the crisis are associated with minor adjustments: The global financial and eco-
nomic crisis fostered paradoxically national policy solutions and growing trust 
in federal institutions, while the Eurocrisis unleashed a return to European 
policy solutions and the impression of amplified and problematic national 
asymmetries. Most of the attitudinal change is not due to electoral turn-over of 
the national parliamentarians, but are caused by MPs slightly shifting their 
stances. This stability is explained by the marked absence of strong Eurosceptic 
parties in domestic politics during the period of investigation.  
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The case most different to Germany is Greece, since it has been the country 
most severely hit by the global financial and economic crisis as well as by the 
sovereign debt crisis. Dimitri Sotiropolous and Yannis Tsirbas demonstrate that 
Europeanness nevertheless still prevails in core dimensions of Europeanness: 
emotional attachment remains pronounced, deepened integration and further 
Europeanization of particular policy areas are supported. Even despite their 
economic recession and the harsh austerity measures Greeks’ elites European-
ness is mainly due to the perception that Greece has benefitted from the EU. 
Thus, the management of the crisis by the EU is negatively evaluated and the 
growing asymmetries within the EU are perceived as most important threat 
indicating that the cost-benefit calculation may become negative, if elites are 
going on to perceive Greece’s interests as not appropriately regarded in the EU. 
The management of the crises by the EU constitutes the main conflict line in 
Greek politics with the left wing SYRIZA and the right wing ANEL sharing a 
less pro-European stance and evaluating the EU policy as more inefficient in 
contrast to the so far established parties. This shared perception separated them 
form the so far established parties and was underlying their coalition formed in 
2015 immediately after the survey despite their antagonism on the left-right-
dimension. The after all still moderate decline in Europeanness of Greek’s 
elites is thus mainly due to electoral turn-over. 
Judging from the comparative analysis conducted before, Hungary stands 
out as the country in which Europeanness has declined most severely in the 
course of the crises. Borbála Göncz and György Lengyel do, however, raise 
attention to the fact that this decline can be first of all attributed to electoral 
turn-over and the tremendously increased share of parliamentary seats for 
FIDESZ, a party that have been significantly less pro-European long before the 
crisis of European integration. In accordance to FIDESZ increased share of 
seats in the national parliament, the inclination of Hungary’s elites to solidarity 
within the EU has deteriorated and the preference for intergovernmental and 
national policy solutions has increased. Nevertheless emotional attachment to 
the EU remains quite high and the perception of Hungary having benefitted 
from being member of the EU as well. Although much of the change is due to 
the growing importance of FIDESZ, the other parties have become less pro-
European as well. 
Similar to Germany, Nicolò Conti, Maurizio Cotta and Luca Verzichelli 
demonstrate that Europeanness of Italians political elites had not altered signif-
icantly during the course of the crises until 2014. This comes as surprise given 
that the Italian party system had undergone a tremendous change in the same 
period with the advent of the populist and anti-European Five Start Movement 
as its pivotal rearrangement, a public opinion significantly less in favour of 
European integration than their elites, and finally the need to enforce austerity 
policies to prevent making demands of the EU rescue mechanisms. All the 
Eurosceptic parties in the Italian parliament are less attached to Europe, do 
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support supranational institutions less but in sum they voice only moderate 
Euroscepticism. Elites from all parties even share a consensus that most of the 
investigated policy areas should be Europeanized. 
The Europeanness of Lithuanias political elite is determined by their small 
size and their geographical exposition at the eastern border of the EU with 
Russia as neighbour. Irmina Matonyte, Gintaras Šumskas and Vaidas 
Morkevičius demonstrate stability regarding the more general facets of Europe-
an integration (attachment, trust, deepening of integration) during the course of 
the crises, in which Lithuania was especially hit by the global financial and 
economic crisis. The authors explain this stability by the advantages ‘pooled 
sovereignty’ provides for the elites of a small state feeling constantly threat-
ened by Russia. However, the prevalence of neoliberal preferences combined 
with intergovernmental conceptions of European integration makes Lithuanians 
elites at the same time reluctant to deepen integration in the realm of fiscal and 
economic policy, in which they rely on national solutions. However, conserva-
tive elites favor this neoliberal, intergovernmental focus more than elites from 
the left. 
The impact of the crises in Spain has been tremendously and is comparable 
to Italy in the sense that both countries adopted austerity measures without 
being formally intervened by the rescue mechanisms of the EU. The Spanish 
population made the EU primarily responsible for the austerity policy and the 
economic deterioration of the country, which led to tremendous changes in the 
party system with the emergence of the new parties – among which Podemos is 
the most Eurosceptic – while the established left and conservative parties lost 
ground. However, this party system change was restricted to the European 
elections of 2014 while the strength of parties in the national elections re-
mained unchanged until the elite survey was conducted. Thus, the decisively 
pro-European orientation of the Spanish elites prevailed during the course of 
the crises as Juan Rodríguez-Teruel, José Real-Dato and Miguel Jerez demon-
strate in their chapter. Moreover, Spanish elites favour a federalist conception 
of European integration and a further Europeanization of core policy areas even 
more in 2014 than they did before the onset of the crises. At the same time and 
similar to Germany, the perception that economic and political asymmetries 
within the EU become increasingly threatening has increased as well. The stabil-
ity of this permissive consensus among the Spanish elites is due to the lack of 
strong electoral achievement of Eurosceptic parties within the time under investi-
gation. This had led to an increasing distance between elites and population, 
which fuelled the emergence of the populist and Eurosceptic Podemos. 
Slovenia’s political elites are characterized by ‘reserved Europeanness’ as 
the article by Matej Makarovič, Lea Prijon, Mateja Rek and Matevž Tomšič 
shows. In general, they share a consensus about the necessity to be part of the 
EU. However, Eurosceptic stances are proposed by the centre-left parties in 
government since they perceive interventions by the EU as shrinking their 
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room of maneuver. In contrast, centre-right parties perceive them as mean to 
attack government which makes them slightly more pro-European in contrast 
to, for instance, Lithuania or Croatia. Beyond these differences, which are 
caused by the competition between opposition and government, elites from 
centre-left are skeptical about the dominance of neoliberal policies within the 
EU, the way EU institutions coped with the challenges of the recent crises, and 
perceive the EU as a threat to their cultural identity – surprisingly even more 
than the elites from the centre-right. 
Like Greece, Portugal was bailed out in the framework of the EU rescue 
packages and mechanisms and had to adopt an unpopular austerity policy. 
While this has decreased the public support for European integration, the polit-
ical landscape did not alter tremendously with no relevant populist or Euro-
sceptic parties entering parliament in the national election held one year after 
the survey was conducted in Portugal. Pedro T. Magalhães, João Cancela and 
Catherine Moury give evidence that the Europeanness of Portuguese’ national 
elites remained unchanged at the most general level of support for European 
integration which is due to the widespread perception that Portugal has benefit-
ted from European integration. However, with the exception of the EP trust in 
European institutions has declined especially among left elites, which may be 
due to doubts about the efficiency of these institutions in coping with the crises.  
The report provided by Dobrinka Kostova targets the political elites in Bul-
garia. It demonstrates that thy elites share strong pro-European attitudes. Their 
Europeanness is especially pronounced with regard to European institutions. 
They trust their national institutions less than the supranational institutions of 
the EU, which Bulgarian elites perceive as promoters of democratization, effi-
cient delivery of economic stability and social integration. 
4.  Staying on Course in Turbulent Times: Continuity and 
Change in the Europeanness of National Political Elites 
The aim of the article was to provide an introductory and comparative over-
view of the development of national elites' Europeanness in the turbulent peri-
od of crises since 2008. The empirical analysis of the several aspects has shown 
that stability and continuity are the prevailing trends over change. Hence, we 
have detected a few common patterns across countries. There is still a strong 
permissive consensus about the more general emotive and cognitive aspects 
attaching individuals to the European project. Indeed, the European sense of 
belonging, trust in the European polity and the positive assessment of how the 
EU has contributed to each country’s development and welfare remain the 
columns of the legitimacy in the European integration project. Moreover, we 
could identify a common pattern towards slight reinforcement of several as-
pects of Europeanness, particularly the support for a stronger role of the EU as 
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an arena for decision-making in core policies. And when the trend shows some 
decline in specific aspects – especially for the attitudes regarding the concrete 
institutional organization of integration – these are relatively modest and do not 
jeopardize the general trends.  
Beyond these general trends, however, the multiple dimensions of elite’s 
Europeanness are strongly shaped by regional and country-specific patterns, 
which could be related to four causal explanatory factors: historical path de-
pendencies in regional areas where some countries share cultural attributes and 
legacies (in this case, Southern and Eastern Europe); the influence of the eco-
nomic development and the particular situation in each country; the specific 
influence of the global financial and economic as well as the sovereign debt 
crisis and its political consequences (particularly, in those countries that have 
experienced processes of bailout); and finally the recent political evolution 
(that could be eventually related to previous factors), indicated by changes in 
governments and party systems. In this respect, Hungary and Greece have 
shown particular remarkable changes in some attitudes and perceptions on 
Europe. 
Certainly, the method and the data employed in this article (and the other 
studies of the special issue) possess some limitations that restrict our inferences 
when trying to carry out some interpretations from this portrait. The time span 
of the ENEC project is a major constraint, as consequences may arise after a 
longer interval than the one covered by the research. In this vein, we should 
avoid to force excessively mechanical interpretations in terms of causes and 
consequences when observing the link between historical events and political 
elites’ opinions and attitudes. 
Overall, the article, as well as the different country studies included in this 
HSR Special Issue, shows that the financial crisis has not substantially eroded 
the Europeanness of the national political elites. Indeed, the stable trends 
shown by most countries in this study allows to discard short-term consequenc-
es for the legitimacy of the European Union. In some aspects, it seems that the 
recent economic and political challenges have provided solid reasons to 
strengthen the role of the European institutions in the policymaking process. 
Accordingly, many members of the political elites in different countries ex-
press better prospects for the European integration. These findings give credit 
to the assumption that national elites’ Europeanness reflects the trade-off be-
tween the empowerment and political support national political elites gain from 
European integration. The crises were severely threatening the room of ma-
noeuvre for elites, since the economic recession and the risk of default de-
creased their state resources tremendously. Relying on (financial and political) 
support by the EU appeared as efficient way to cope with the challenges of the 
crises, which reinforced elites general Europeanness. However, the result that 
growing asymmetries are considered by most of the elites as the strongest (in-
ternal) threat to European integration underlines that the strategy of ‘empow-
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erment by integration’ can cause divergent results for the national elites. Ac-
cordingly, elites’ Europeanness has decreased especially in countries, which 
perceive the crisis management by the EU as inefficient.  
Given this stable pro-European attitudes among elites, the risk of an increas-
ing gap between elites and non-elites’ attitudes regarding the EU occurs, be-
cause of the deterioration of support and the negative perception of the EU 
among the population. The analysis in some countries suggest that this gap 
could be further eroding the popular basis of the elites’ permissive consensus 
on Europe, paving the way for new actors seeking the vote of those voters less 
enthusiastic with Europe. In rational anticipation of these developments and the 
entailing electoral losses, established elites may adjust their Europeanness to 
prevent or curb the emergence of populist anti-European parties. Given the 
multidimensional structure of Europeanness, it is most likely that they adapt 
their preferences towards the concrete organization of integration rather than to 
the general dimensions. The presented results corroborate this view demon-
strating that the shift in Europeanness during the course of the crises is rather 
regarding the means but not the aim of European integration. 
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